According to the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871) France lost Alsace and Lorraine. In the paper I estimate how the new border affected a growth of nearby towns. Applying difference-in-differences methodology to census data for 1831-1911, I obtain paradoxical result. The new border boosted the growth of nearby towns. Extra urban growth in a 70 km border region reached 4.23 per cent p.a. in 1872-6, and was smaller, but still significantly positive, later. Point estimate of the total border effect in 1872-1911 is 134 per cent. This effect survives in more homogeneous subsamples and is robust to a number of specification changes.
Introduction
National borders have a substantial influence on international trade as well as on the development of both border and inner regions. The influence of borders depends on the costs of crossing them (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) , Hillberry and Hummels (2003) , Hanson (2001) ). Krugman (1991) developed the new economic geography approach for trade costs analysis that is based on economies of scale in production and love for variety in consumption. Borders may affect economic activity in a particular region through access to markets for both local population and firms. Market size is limited by transportation costs involved in trade with nearby regions.
Additional border crossing costs diminish regional market size, which, combined with economies of scale, means a smaller variety of goods and lower welfare, in turn stimulating migration to more appealing locations. Krugman's model predicts migration into a larger region.
In order to take both centrifugal and centripetal forces into account, Helpman (1998) assumed inelastically supplied nontradable amenities specific to particular towns and consumed by local populations (e.g. land or housing). As demand for the amenities in a town shifts right along with the local population growth, the price for these goods increases. Finally, higher price for amenities counterbalances gains from product diversity, and the economy reaches equilibrium. Redding and Sturm (2008) modified Helpman's model for the case of multiple towns and proposed using natural experiments to determine the role of borders. They analysed the consequences of the establishment and dissolution of the Iron Curtain dividing Germany on border towns of Western Germany. Using the difference-in-differences method, they showed that the Iron Curtain inhibited the growth of border towns, while its dissolution acted in an opposite manner.
Their result supports the new economic geography theory.
Economists have applied Redding and Sturm's methodology to several other episodes and datasets, and the results nearly always have been robust and in agreement with the theory. For example, Brakman et al. (2012) found that eurointegration has added to population growth rates in border towns. Ploeckl (2010) investigated in detail the effect of Saxony's decision to join the Zollverein, or German Customs Union, in 1834 on Saxon urban growth. He found that population growth was higher in towns where trade costs dropped, while it declined along the Custom Union's border with Austria, where trade costs rose.
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Alternatively, employment has also been used instead of population. Brülhart et al. (2012) analysed employment across Austrian municipalities before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
They revealed a heavy and robust growth of employment in Eastern border municipalities compared with inner municipalities after the Iron Curtain fell. Ploeckl (2013) found a negative border effect on male industrial employment that arose from Baden's accession to the Zollverein in 1836.
Papers based on different methodologies have demonstrated negative border effects as well. Hanson (2001) found that creation of NAFTA stirred employment growth in Mexico regions on the border with the USA. Rietveld (2012) predicted the possibility of a positive border effect on border region economic activity in specific situations. However, in examining the scale of transnational transportation when compared to intranational transportation, he found no signs of such an effect.
While in most cases negative border effect is strong and robust, several exceptions have been found. Ploeckl (2013) noted that industrial employment among women grew in response to higher trade costs across Swiss border. Ploeckl argued that this happened because of tariff-jumping foreign direct investment in the textile industry. This explanation is beyond the scope of ReddingSturm model. Ploeckl (2010) also noted that trade costs changes had affected population growth in towns along both Bohemian and Thuringian borders, but not close to Prussian border. However, the urban population of the latter region grew rapidly before as well as after Saxony's accession to the customs union. Ploeckl argued that Saxon migration driven by the annexation of Northern Saxony by Prussia in 1815 might have produced this effect.
In this paper I use Redding and Sturm's methodology to study the growth of French towns in 1831-1911, employing the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany in 1871 as a natural experiment. I split the sample of towns that remained in France after 1871 into a treatment group of towns close to the new German border and a control group composed of inner towns. In my results, unlike those of most studies, I find that the shift of the border was followed by a more rapid growth of new French border towns compared with the growth of towns in inner regions. This result holds for different subsamples and for a range of model specifications. This effect can be explained partially by the inflow of Alsatians into the new border region as well as by the deployment of garrisons and fort construction.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I briefly survey the historical context of the border shift. Section 3 outlines the main dataset. Section 4 describes the baseline empirical approach, and Section 5 reports results. I examine possible explanations of the observed effect in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. 
Historical background
A change in a national border is a complex phenomenon. Population movements may arise not only in response to trade costs, but can be driven by other mechanisms, including cultural or political issues. The historical background of the border shift event may provide ideas of how to separate trade cost effects from accompanying influences.
As laid out in the Treaty of Frankfurt, signed on 10 May 1871, France lost Alsace-Lorraine and was obliged to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs to Germany. German troops occupying the north-western part of France secured this obligation. The annexed parts of Alsace and Lorraine included both Alsatian departments with the exception of the Territory of Belfort, all but the westernmost part of Moselle, Briey, the north-eastern part of Meurthe, and the Schirmeck region to the northeast of Vosges. Slightly fewer than 1.6 million people lived in these territories on the eve of the war 4 .
By default, inhabitants of the annexed territories obtained German citizenship instead of French citizenship. However, Article 2 of the Treaty of Frankfurt gave these people the right to keep their citizenship and move to France. This right was known as the "Option." It makes sense to discuss who actually had this "Option," what was required to do to exercise it, and in what timeframe.
Article 2 of the Treaty gave the Option to those French citizens who lived and had been born in the annexed lands. This wording was a lapse, and in fact, the Option was applied both to inhabitants and natives of Alsace and Lorraine (see Brasme, 2000, pp. 109-110) . However, French citizens born outside of Alsace-Lorraine usually kept their citizenship without having to exercise the Option (Roth, 2011, p. 95) .
To keep their French citizenship, optants were obliged to fill out a form before 1 October 1872, and were required to move out of the annexed lands. The Options of those who failed to leave the annexed region in time were subject to cancellation. However, unrealised options were annulled only on 25 June 1874 (Roth, 2011, p. 106, ft. 55) .
Germany registered 161,878 optants applied for French citizenship. The French numbers were as high as 388,150. The difference arose in particular from significant pre-war migration from the annexed region to the west of the country. These migrants exercised the Option in France, but were not counted by the German administration. According to German data, 68.5 per cent of options were annulled as applicants failed to leave Germany. Thus, according to the German figures, 50,638 inhabitants left the annexed territories (Barbier, 1979, p. 121) . The French census of 1872 was conducted between 15 April and 15 May (Biraben, 1963, p. 326 exporters who specialised in manufactured goods faced higher tariffs before the commercial treaty of 1862 lowered these costs as well (Lampe, 2009 (Lampe, , p. 1015 .
After the war, trade flows reversed. Germany contributed a quarter to a third of total French imports of manufactured goods, including ferrous metals, metal tools, and yarn and cotton fabrics between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. These changes were partially due to rapid industrialisation in Germany. Nevertheless, Dedinger (2012) Alsace and Lorraine not only produced plenty of manufactured goods, but also spread technology and business practices to and received orders from nearby regions. This was especially true of the cotton industry. Vosgesian weaving enterprises enjoying access to cheap hydraulic energy processed Alsatian cotton yarn and returned fabric to Alsace (see Dedinger, 2012 , Laffitte, 1912 were actually produced in Alsace and Lorraine (see more details in Dedinger, 2012) .
With the end of the temporary duty-free regime, imports dropped, despite the fact that tariffs were quite low (Lampe, 2009 (Lampe, , p. 1020 Barry, 1979 , both provides detailed statistical evidence about optants' presence in Nancy and describes particular cases).
Most of the then-known iron ore fields of Lorraine were situated in the annexed lands. Only
Longwy and Villerupt remained in France. However, new fields were soon explored. In particular, an exceptionally rich basin in Briey was brought into use after 1894. As a result, the region regained its leadership in French pig iron and steel production (Laffitte, 1912) .
The French defeat in the war affected not only migration and industrial development, but
French military doctrine as well. To counterbalance the German threat, the fortification program of Séré de Rivières was implemented and conscription was introduced in 1873-74. Both these changes influenced mostly the border region. New forts and other retrenchments were constructed along the new Franco-German border. Conscripts typically served in their home region. However, regiments were more densely placed along the border and supplemented with soldiers from inner regions.
The border shift westwards separated the annexed departments of France from their major trade partners. Unlike the most striking cases studied earlier (Redding and Sturm, 2008, Brülhart et al., 2012 ) the trade barriers that subsequently arose were not prohibitively high. However, the border shift did affect interregional economic linkages. Additional consequences of the annexation included fortification and garrison deployment in the new border region as well as migration from the annexed territory. Redding and Sturm (2008) account for the last effect and report that, while significant, migration does not explain the border effect. 
For my analysis, I selected towns and administrative centres listed in INSEE's General
Statistics of France. 6 Generally, this includes towns with a population of 2,000 or greater. I excluded cities in Île-de-France, whose development is tightly linked with that of Paris and most likely differs significantly from the tendencies that prevailing in other regions of France. Alsace and Lorraine, Savoy, and towns in the region of Nice were not always French during this period, and I therefore excluded them as well. Several towns were incorporated during the period and few more were absorbed by their neighbours. As a result, 405 towns were left in the sample.
In general, the territorial division of France for the studied period was stable. Less than a quarter of the towns in my sample experienced urban border shifts during the period. To exclude population jumps caused by the border shifts, I ran the following procedure: I determined the subset of communes with stable borders during the period that included a town of interest and calculated the population of the set of communes during the whole period. There were only four cases in which border shifts affected more than five communes. Two of these were excluded from the sample. Thus, the final sample contains 403 towns. The panel is unbalanced, as about 1 per cent of observations on population dynamics are missing.
9 4. Empirical strategy
Baseline difference-in-differences model
My approach for estimating the border effect is based on the difference-in-differences approach (DID) and is very close to that of Redding and Sturm (2008) . I consider the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine as an exogenous treatment event for towns located near the new border. The remaining towns in the sample make up a control group as their commercial links with the markets of Alsace and Lorraine were looser, and hence additional trade costs affected them to a lesser extent.
The theory predicts that the population growth of border towns would be inhibited after the establishment of a new border. However, it is not enough to compare population growth rates of towns in the middle of the country and at the border, as particular towns may develop more quickly than others due to reasons not related to the border.
DID is designed to overcome this problem by comparing changes in the treatment group after the treatment with changes in the control group for the same periods. Equation 1 describes the simplest DID model.
where it y denotes annualised population growth rate in town i at period t, t d is a time dummy variable equal to 1 after the treatment and equal to 0 otherwise (i.e., 1
for the treatment group of border towns and 0
for the control group of inner towns), and it u includes town effects and errors. In this case  which is the parameter of interest, shows a difference between population growth rates in the treatment and control groups in the period after the treatment compared to the period before the treatment.
Data for multiple periods are available, allowing for more precise estimates and for additional tests. To account for urban population growth changes, I introduced period dummy variables and their products with a treatment group dummy variable for every period except the last period before the war (1861-66), which is the base period in all models. 7 The model may include additional control variables as in (2): 7 To simplify notation here and below, I use three digits to denote a time period.
The Helpman-Redding-Sturm model predicts that a larger population inhibits population growth as a town reaches its equilibrium size. That is why I inserted the log of population size as a control to all the models, and expect a negative effect of population size.
Random or fixed effects?
Model (2) does not specify u it . The random effect model (RE) presumes
where v i is random town effect, and ε it is observation-specific error. Alternatively, a fixed effect (FE) specification implies decomposition (4):
where δ i is a deterministic town parameter.
In the context of the Helpman-Redding-Sturm model, towns are endowed with various unobserved stocks of amenities. Hence, their equilibrium sizes are different. This feature of the model is captured by the combination of the negative effect of population and the individual town
effect. An equilibrium town size is larger as its individual effect is bigger. However, one would expect that factual town size is highly correlated with the equilibrium size. That is why town effect is probably correlated with town size, which is a control variable. In this case, the random effect model is inconsistent.
A typical way to choose between fixed and random effect models is to run the Hausman test.
However, it is designed for homoscedastic errors it  only. Population growth rate variances differ significantly across towns. I therefore turned to a robust model of clustered errors. Arellano (1993) proposed 
Border region size
A composition of the treatment group depends both on the width of the border region and the measure of distance applied. Ploeckl (2010) and Brülhart et al. (2012) provide evidence in 11 favour of a 30 km zone and Redding and Sturm (2008) demonstrate the border effect for 50 km and 75 km widths, while Brakman et al. (2012) argues in favour of border regions 70 km wide.
Great circle distance (Sturm and Redding, 2008) or road distance (Brülhart et al., 2012) are the distance measures most typically used in these studies. Ploeckl (2010) adjusts road distance for road quality. Figure 1 shows pre-war and post-war annual average population growth rates for towns in a 100 km border region as defined by great circle distance from the closest Alsatian commune. The towns are arranged by decreasing distance from the border. As we can see, population growth accelerated significantly in the 50 km border region. inhabiting a circle of a given radius around a town. A higher share indicates stronger market size decline after the border shift. The distance data are presented in the Appendix, Table A2 . 
Presence and size of border effect
If treatment has no effect on the dependent variable, cross-product coefficients are equal to zero jointly. 
alternative that at least one of the coefficients is not equal to zero.
The effect may be statistically significant, but quantitatively negligible. I draw attention to the fact that the dependent variable is an annualised population growth rate, and is calculated as follows: 
to the log of population. This effect does not account for negative feedback due to population growth.
Testing for parallel trends
The difference-in-differences approach is based on the assumption that both control and treatment groups demonstrate the same behaviour in the absence of the treatment (see discussion in Meyer (1995) 
. Rejection of H 0 indicates uncontrolled differences between dynamics in treatment and comparison groups. For example, an epidemic of cholera affected the border region more severely than it did the rest of France during the warm months of 13 1854. Mortality in the border region was two to three times higher than usual (see Bordelais et al., 1978) , producing lower estimates of 851  .
Basic estimation results
In this section I choose the model, demonstrate the sign of the border effect, and show evidence justifying my choice of border width parameters. Additionally, I check if the control and treatment groups behaved in similar ways before the war. Table 2 presents the results.
The significant auxiliary regressor in the Arellano model favours fixed effect models. This finding is in accord both with the Helpman-Redding-Sturm model and with earlier results.
I estimate the border effect for the 0-50 km border region (14 towns in the treatment group) and for the 0-70 km region (19 towns). Additionally, I estimate the effect for both the 0-50 km and 51-100 km groups together (the latter group includes 13 towns); see Table A3 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics on population growth rates across periods for control and treatment groups, and
Appendix Table A4 in for the composition of these groups.
As can be seen from the estimation results, the border effect is positive and highly significant both for 0-50 km and 0-70 km regions in most of after-war periods (with the exceptions of 1876-81 and 1896-1901) . This effect is quantitatively large as well. The population of border towns more than doubled due to the border effect alone. The effect is especially strong for the first after-war period (1872-76). For the 51-100 km treatment group, the total effect is small and insignificant, while it is still significant for the first after-war period.
To check if this divergence in growth rates after the war is due to nonparallel trends in the control and treatment groups, I tested the pre-war cross-product coefficients. While none of them are significant individually for the 50 km region before the war, they are significant jointly.
However, the significance of the differences is not high and is indistinguishable for the 70 km region. The effect of cholera in 1854 is too weak to be seen in estimated coefficients.
We may expect that the new border affected both French and German border regions in the same way. Thus, it seems reasonable to check for both the presence and sign of the border effect on German border regions also. As a result of the war, the border shifted to the West, placing the former border region inside the country. The Helpman model therefore implies a positive effect from the border shift for the former German border region, while the negative effect is in line with my results for France. 
Further analysis

Garrisons
Garrison deployment across a country is driven mostly by non-economic factors. The border shift might have caused a significant inflow of military men to a region, which was formally inside 16 the country and subsequently becomes a border region. While published occupational data from censuses are quite fragmentary and often not subject to comparisons, these data are present for the censuses of 1872 and 1876. 8 Thus, it is possible to account for garrison redeployment during the most interesting period, namely, just after the treatment. 
where t i
Gar
, shows the military population of town i at period t. The results are presented in Table 4 Garrison deployment increases town population significantly, though less than by a one-toone ratio to population. Controlling for the size of a garrison diminishes the anomaly point estimate of population growth in the border region towns by more than by half, and reduces the total border effect by 43 per cent. Nonetheless, both coefficients remain high and significant.
Alsatian migration
The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine intensified migration from the region to France. The border region attracted a relatively high share of migrants (see Barbier, 1979 ) for a quantitative study of this tendency). It is not clear how many inhabitants of the annexed region (or simply Alsatians) moved to France after the census of 1872, but this migration was noticeable both through the expiration of the Option and beyond. To account for this migration, I used INSEE's departmental data on the number of inhabitants born in the annexed Alsace and Lorraine territory according to the censuses of 1872 and 1911. 9 The shares of population originating from the annexed Alsace and Lorraine are shown in Fig. 2 While the deviations might be explainable by variations in mortality rates, for example, due to differences between the age structures of migrants, I supposed that migration was the main source of these differences. I calculated the anomalies in (7) We see from Table 4 that Alsatian migration after the census of 1872 had a significant effect on border town population growth. The total effect of migration is surprisingly large. For example, excessive (compared to the national average) Alsatian migration to Meurthe-and-Moselle was only 0.269 per cent, or 983 persons. Nevertheless, according to point estimates, it added 14 per cent to urban population of the region. The anomaly is equal to 0.219 per cent, or 862 persons, for Vosges, and is responsible for 11 per cent of the town's population growth. However, estimates are only marginally significant, and a much smaller effect cannot be ruled out. To account for this effect, I constructed a measure of fortification construction intensity around a particular town for every after-war period, equal to the number of forts established in the town's neighbourhood between censuses per thousand inhabitants for each town. Data on fort construction is compiled from Index de la fortification française 1874 -1914, 10 and is presented in Table A6 in the Appendix.
The model estimates presented in Table 4 show that, while fort construction positively affected urban growth in neighbouring towns, the total border effect remains large and significantly positive. Redding and Sturm (2008) predicted that the border more strongly affects smaller towns' market potential and, hence, their growth. To account for this effect, I split my sample into two groups. Large towns had a population above the median as of 1866, while small towns had a population that was below or equal to the median. Coutances, with a population of 8159, turned out to be a "median town."
Town size
I introduced the Small dummy variable, equal to 1 for small towns and 0 otherwise (see Table A4 in the Appendix), and constructed its cross products with every time and treatment group dummy variable.
The results are presented in Table 4 . To test for parallel trends, I plugged all pre-war crossproducts, both with and without the Small dummy variable, into the test. We can see signs of discrepancies between trends before the war. While the presence of the border affected small and large towns in different ways after the war, there is no evidence that the total border effect on tiny towns was more negative (or less positive). Though the effect point estimate for smaller towns is lower, the difference is insignificant. The population of bigger towns, according to point estimates, is doubled due to the presence of the border. This effect is statistically significant as well. 
North and South
As mentioned in Section 2, major iron ore fields were discovered in the border region after the war. This event might have led to quicker urban growth in the north, but not in the textile-based south.
To control for this, I split my treatment group into northern and southern subgroups and introduced a North dummy variable equal to 1 for northern towns close to the iron ore fields, and 0 otherwise (see Table A4 in the Appendix). Note that only towns from the treatment group can be northern or southern, as this dichotomy makes no sense for other regions. As in the previous case, I
constructed a set of cross-products and plugged them into model.
The estimates reported in Table 4 show that urban growth in the north is virtually the same as in the south in every after-war period. Interestingly, there is a marginally significant discrepancy between the pre-war growth of the southern treatment subgroup and that of the control group, which was not observed between the whole treatment group and the control group. This likely indicates that the whole treatment group represents the sample better.
Full model
While no controls were able to explain the positive border effect separately, I hypothesised that they might explain the border effect when combined together. I therefore inserted all regressors into my model except those related to the north/south dichotomy.
The estimates presented in Table 4 show that the total border effect is still significantly positive in the full model and has virtually the same size as in other regressions accounting for at least one of the additional controls. According to the point estimate, the presence of the border increased urban population by 60 per cent. A garrison of 100 men deployed in a town increases the population by 71 persons, which is only slightly less than the estimate produced in the garrison regression. The migration effect is slightly larger than the estimate produced in the migration regression, and the fort effect is positive and highly significant. In general, full regression estimates agree with those of shorter models. However, in this model we see a significant discrepancy between the pre-war dynamics of urban growth in the control and treatment groups. This finding indicates that the groups probably differ systematically from each other. In this case, the differencein-differences approach is misleading. To deal with these discrepancies, I apply propensity score matching in the last subsection. 
Propensity score matching based control group
The differences observed in town behaviour may arise from the different nature of these towns. Large and complex commercial and administrative centres may not develop in the same way as industrial towns growing around mines, metal works, or textile factories, or smaller ancient cantonal centres still focused on agricultural activity. Table 5 presents a summary of size and occupational structure of French towns according to the census of 1866.
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It is obvious that the towns in the treatment group are, on average, relatively small, with a relatively small agricultural population, while the share of the population employed in liberal professions and rentiers is relatively high. Moreover, the control group is noticeably more heterogeneous. A prediction based on probit modelling shows that population size and structure as of 1866 significantly affect the chances of recruitment into the treatment group. Table 6 shows the estimation results. The share of agricultural population was excluded due to collinearity. Notes: The dependent variable is equal to 1 for towns in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses; *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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To make the control group more similar to the treatment group, I used the propensity score matching procedure. There is a trade-off between the similarity between the matched control group and the treatment group on the one side, and power of tests due to sample sizes on the other. In this study, the treatment group is rather small while the control group is about twenty times larger. To retain the power of the tests, I matched towns in a 1:5 proportion. Repetitions were allowed.
Matched towns are presented in Table A7 in the Appendix.
The matched control group is described in Table 5 , and does indeed resemble the treatment group more closely both in terms of means and variances.
I estimate baseline and full models based on the matched control sample. The results are in Table 4 . Non-parallel trends are absent in both groups before treatment. This might be due to greater similarity between the compared groups. However, baseline model estimates for the matched and full sample are very close to each other.
The matched and full sample full model estimates demonstrate similarity as well. The border effect is slightly smaller according to the matched model, with a point estimate of 45 per cent, but only marginally significant. The migration effect is two times higher, reaching 37 per cent for Meurthe-and-Moselle and 29 per cent for Vosges. As in the full sample model, there is a significant effect from fort construction.
Conclusions
I studied the border effect on urban growth using the Franco-German border shift in 1871 as a natural experiment. New economic geography predicts a negative effect, as borders increase trade costs and shrink market potential and public welfare.
I applied the difference-in-differences approach. Towns along the new border constituted a treatment group, while the control group was constituted of other French towns farther from the border.
Based on population growth data for seven five-year periods preceding 1871, I found no signs of different trends in urban growth in the treatment and control groups for all models except two. After applying propensity score matching, nonparallel trends observed in those two cases disappeared as well. The trends diverged after the war. The border town growth rates accelerated significantly, which was not the case for inner towns.
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Neither symmetric effect, nor the effect predicted by the new economic geography theory, was observed in a small sample of German towns. Moreover, the point estimates of the effect were quite low in this case. This difference in results obtained suggests the need to look for countryspecific explanations for population growth in the French border region.
The border shift resulting from the French defeat in the war was accompanied by migration from the annexed lands as well as by garrison deployment and fort construction along the new border. Unsurprisingly, all these processes led to faster population growth and were both statistically significant and quantitatively large. Accounting for all these effects reduces the border effect estimation approximately by half. Nonetheless, it is still significantly positive.
Estimations do not show significant differences between the border effect on smaller and that on larger towns. However, in all cases point estimates are smaller for small towns. Urban growth in the northern metallurgic region was similar to that seen in the textile-based south.
The negative effect of borders on market potential and welfare in border regions is soundly backed theoretically and is supported by numerous empirical studies, including those based on a quasi-experimental approach. This research, however, provides a puzzling counterexample. Solving the puzzle may help both to attune the theory and to improve the accuracy of quasi-experimental design in this field.
For example, my research shows that, while urban growth in the French border region was similar to the development process of towns in the other parts of France, the situation changed after the border shift and as a result of it. The annexation-induced migrations, the construction of forts protecting the new border, and the deployment of new garrisons along the border significantly affected the population of the border region. However, this influence was not an effect of the drop in market potential we are interested in. This finding points out the importance of an accurate choice of controls, even in case of quasi-experimental design. 
